INTRODUCTION
Quantitative risk management models, such as RiskMetrics for market risks or CreditMetrics for credit risks, should yield the probability distribution for portfolio losses over a specified risk horizon. Based on this loss distribution, risk measures such as value-at-risk (VaR) or expected shortfall (ES) can be computed. However, the financial and economic crisis of 2007-9 has shown that, for various reasons, the models' risk predictions are not always reliable. Banks (and taxpayers) had to bear huge losses that should not have been possible according to the risk models.
As a consequence, stress tests have gained importance for banks and bank supervisors as a supplement to quantitative risk management approaches. Stress tests can show whether the survivability of a bank is ensured even when extreme but plausible scenarios occur (ie, the bank is liquid and has enough regulatory and economic capital according to the first and second pillar, respectively, of Basel II). Topics that are covered by the recent stress-test research literature are, among others, macro stress tests
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(see, for example, Wong et al (2008) ), worst-case analyses (see, for example, Breuer et al (2008 Breuer et al ( , 2009 ), estimation of confidence intervals for risk parameters (see, for example, Rösch and Scheule (2007) ) and stress tests for (credit) risk concentrations (see, for example, Bonti et al (2006) ). Meanwhile, supervisory authorities also stress that it is necessary to carry out socalled reverse stress tests (see, for example, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009), Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2009) or Financial Services Authority (2008, 2009) ). While, for regular stress tests, scenarios are chosen based on historical experience or expert knowledge and their influence on the bank's survivability is assessed, reverse stress tests aim to find exactly those scenarios (ie, combinations of realizations of relevant risk factors or risk parameters) that cause the bank to cross the frontier between survival and default (see Figure 1) . Afterward, the most likely of these scenarios has to be found. Reverse stress tests are not intended to be a substitute for regular stress tests, rather, they are intended to be a supplement. According to the supervisory authorities, banks should be allowed to carry out quantitative as well as qualitative reverse stress tests, especially in the beginning when this concept is first applied. However, as the definition of a reverse stress test already implies a certain degree of precision (we do not look for some scenarios that cause the default of a bank, but we look for exactly those scenarios that cause the bank to be on the edge of a default), it is not clear at all what a qualitative reverse stress test could be or how it could be carried out. Bank supervisors stress that the critical reflection of the results of a reverse stress test should have priority. They hope that the bank's senior management will assess the most probable reverse-stress-test scenario to be more realistic than ad hoc defined scenarios in regular stress tests that cause (expected) losses and (conditional) economic capital requirements to exceed the existing capital buffer of the bank many times over. Thus, it is more likely that the bank management will take action early (eg, to reduce the bank's risk exposure or to increase the capital buffer). Furthermore, the results of reverse stress tests provide a further landmark for the bank's risk management to evaluate the plausibility of scenarios used in regular stress tests.
Formally, the following optimization problem has to be solved for carrying out a quantitative reverse stress test:
increase in the expected portfolio loss, conditional on realizations of the systematic risk factors at t D H (which corresponds to a decrease in the existing capital buffer B)
where EOEV P .H / is the unconditional expected portfolio value at t D H , EOEV P .H / j X.!; H / is the expected portfolio value conditional on realizations of the systematic risk factors at t D H , VaR˛; H .V P .H / j X.!; H // is the value-at-risk conditional on realizations of the systematic risk factors at t D H (which corresponds to the conditional capital requirement) and B is the existing capital buffer. First, we have to solve an inversion problem: we have to find those realizations of the systematic risk factors X.H / D .X 1 .H /; : : : ; X N .H // at the risk horizon t D H of the reverse stress test that consume the existing capital buffer B by an increase of the expected loss and the respective (conditional) economic capital requirement (eg, measured by VaR at some confidence level˛; see Figure 2 on the next page). Then, the most probable of these reverse-stress-test scenarios has to be determined. When we use VaR as an economic capital measure and define it as the difference between the conditional expected portfolio value at t D H and the (1 ˛)-percentile of the conditional probability distribution of the portfolio value V P .H /, the optimization problem (1.1) becomes:
Alternatively, the expected shortfall, defined as the difference between the conditional expected portfolio value at t D H and the conditional expectation of those portfolio values that are smaller than the (1 ˛)-percentile of the conditional probability FIGURE 2 Loss density in stress scenarios.
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This figure shows how the expected loss and the economic capital (measured by the value-at-risk VaR˛; H at a confidence level of˛and at the risk horizon H ) can change in stress scenarios. The solid line denotes the loss density in the normal scenario, while the dotted line denotes the loss density in the stress scenario. distribution of V P .H /, can be used. In this case, the optimization problem is:
Solving the inversion problem to find the set˝ and determining the scenario probabilities P .f!g/.! 2˝ / gets mathematically more demanding the greater the number of (potentially dependent) relevant risk factors for the portfolio value (eg, risk-free interest rates, credit spreads, exchange rates, equity market indices, macroeconomic factors and so on) and the greater the complexity of the portfolio structure (many different financial instruments held as short and long positions). Unfortunately, despite the intensity with which the necessity of reverse stress tests is discussed by bank supervisors, there is not much scientific literature on how to carry out a quantitative reverse stress test in practice. In general, only case studies for simply structured portfolios with one or two risk factors can be found. For example, Liermann and Klauck (2009) present examples of a reverse stress test for a portfolio of default risk-free (foreign currency) bonds. As risk factors, they consider a parallel shift of the term structure of risk-free interest rates or a variation of the exchange rate. One exception is Skoglund and Chen (2009) , who propose the Kullback information measure for determining the relative importance of risk factors for the profits and losses of arbitrary (even nonlinear) portfolios. Skoglund and Chen argue that, with the help of this information measure, the relevant risk factors of portfolios that might be exposed to hundreds of risk factors could be identified and, afterward, these risk factors could be considered in a reverse stress test. Thus, they propose some kind of dimension reduction to make the inversion problem inherent in a reverse stress test more feasible. This paper's main contribution to the literature is to demonstrate that so-called bottom-up approaches, which are part of the growing literature on integrated risk management, represent an ideal framework for carrying out quantitative reverse stress tests.
1 For a correct aggregation of losses resulting from different risk types and, hence, a correct computation of total economic capital requirements, existing stochastic dependencies between risk-specific losses have to be considered by integrated risk management approaches. For example, changes in market risk variables, such as riskfree interest rates, can have an influence on the default probabilities of obligors. A prominent recent example of when this dependency became obvious is the subprime crisis. Banks predominantly compute economic capital requirements for each risk type separately and, later, with or without considering diversification effects, these various capital requirements are aggregated to a total economic capital number. Two more sophisticated approaches proposed for computing total economic capital requirements are the so-called top-down approach and the bottom-up approach (see, for example, Grundke (2009) for an overview of integrated risk management techniques). Within the top-down approach, the separately determined marginal distributions of profits and losses resulting from different risk types (eg, market, credit and operational risk) are linked by copula functions to model their joint distribution function. In contrast, bottom-up approaches model the complex interactions between different risk types on the level of the individual financial instruments and risk factors (see Section 2). Thus, they allow us to solve the inversion problem inherent in reverse stress tests and, in particular, to compute the probabilities of reverse-stress-test scenarios in consideration of existing risk dependencies. Drüen and Florin (2010) . However, they do not use a fullfledged bottom-up approach but, rather, they employ two separate approaches for interest rate risk and default risk, and additionally some exogenous (not further described) functional relationships between shifts of the term structure of risk-free interest rates and the default probabilities. 2 A combination of bottom-up and top-down approaches is also imaginable. For example, bottom-up approaches could be employed for different portfolios and, afterward, the resulting loss distributions are linked by a copula function.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, bottom-up approaches are discussed and a specific approach that is later used for the reverse stress test is briefly reviewed. In Section 3, the reverse-stress-test procedure is described in detail and Section 4 contains the results. In Section 5, the main conclusions and possible extensions of the analysis are summarized.
THE BOTTOM-UP APPROACH AS A SPECIFIC INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE
Bottom-up approaches model interactions between different risk types on the level of the individual financial instruments and risk factors. The individual instruments might be treasuries, corporate bonds, futures, swaps, (compound) options, credit derivatives and so on. Potential risk factors are risk-free interest rates, credit spreads, exchange rates, equity market indices, macroeconomic factors and many more. Changes in these risk factors can have a direct impact on the market value of the financial instruments (eg, an increase in risk-free interest rates causes a decrease in the value of treasuries) or they indirectly influence the instrument's value (eg, a decrease in the gross domestic product might be positively correlated with an increase of the default probabilities in a specific country and, hence, with market value reductions of corporate bonds). Market value changes of different financial instruments in a bank portfolio are stochastically dependent when their market values are directly or indirectly influenced by the same or stochastically dependent risk factors. Modeling the stochastic fluctuations of each risk factor, their multivariate dependence and their influence on the market value of each financial instrument in the portfolio allows the total loss distribution of the portfolio to be determined. Typically, the loss distribution produced by bottom-up approaches comprises losses caused by the risk types "market risk" and "credit risk". This loss distribution already takes into consideration diversification effects between these two risk types. It allows the total economic capital needed to absorb losses from market and credit risk to be simultaneously determined. Thus, there is no need for a later aggregation of risk-specific economic capital numbers or risk-specific loss distributions by copulas. Recent contributions to the literature on bottom-up approaches include, for example, Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) , Breuer et al (2010) , Brockmann and Kalkbrener (2010) and Drehmann et al (2010) .
To demonstrate the usage of bottom-up models for quantitative reverse stress testing, we employ as an example a similar approach to Grundke (2005 Grundke ( , 2010 . For the convenience of the reader, this specific bottom-up approach is briefly reviewed in what follows. The approach of Grundke (2005 Grundke ( , 2010 consists of an extended CreditMetrics model. This extension exhibits correlated interest rate and rating-specific credit-spread risk. The risk horizon of the model and the reverse stress test is denoted by H . The number of possible credit qualities of the bank's obligors at the risk horizon is K: 1 denotes the best rating grade (eg, Aaa) and K denotes the worst rating grade, which is the default state. The conditional probability of migrating from rating grade i 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g to k 2 f2; : : : ; K 1g at the risk horizon H is given by:
where Á n 0 and Á n H , respectively, denote the rating grade of obligor n 2 f1; : : : ; N g in t D 0 and at the risk horizon t D H , respectively, and˚. / is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. The conditional default probability is:
and the conditional probability of having the best rating grade 1 is given by:
Given an initial rating grade i , the conditional migration probabilities are not assumed to be obligor-specific. The thresholds R i k are derived from a transition matrix Q D .q ik / 16i 6K 1; 16k6K whose elements q ik specify the (unconditional) probability that an obligor will migrate from the rating grade i to the rating grade k at the risk horizon.
3 Based on historical rating data, such transition matrices are provided by large rating agencies, for example, Moody's or Standard & Poor's. The above specification of the conditional migration probabilities corresponds to defining a two-factor model for explaining the return R n on firm n's assets in the CreditMetrics model:
where Z, X r and " 1 ; : : : ; " N are mutually independent, standard normally distributed stochastic variables. The random variables " n stand for idiosyncratic credit risk, X r represents an interest rate factor and Z is another systematic credit risk factor that might be thought of as an equity risk factor. But, since this factor can also be a macroeconomic variable 4 or an aggregation of several systematic risk factors, Z is just called a systematic credit risk factor, by which all firms are affected, in what follows. 5 An obligor n with current rating grade i is assumed to be in rating grade k at the risk horizon when the realization of R n lies between the two thresholds R i kC1
. The specification (2.4) ensures that the correlation Corr.R n ; R m /, n ¤ m, between the asset returns of two different obligors is equal to R . The correlation Corr.R n ; X r / between the asset returns and the factor X r is X r ;R . As X r is also the random variable that drives the term structure of risk-free interest rates (see (2.5) in the following), X r ;R is the correlation between the asset returns and the risk-free interest rates.
For simplicity, the stochastic evolution of the term structure of risk-free interest rates is modeled by the approach of Vasicek (1977) . Thus, the risk-free short rate is modeled as a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and can be represented at the risk horizon H by:
where X r N.0; 1/ and Ä; Â; r 2 R C are constants. As the random variable X r also enters the definition of the conditional transition probabilities (2.1)-(2.3), the risk of transitions between the rating grades and interest rate risk are stochastically dependent in this model.
The price of a defaultable zero-coupon bond with face value 1 and maturity date T n at the risk horizon H , whose issuer n exhibits the rating grade Á n H 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g at that date, is given by:
Here, R.X r ; H; T n / denotes the stochastic risk-free spot rate for the time interval OEH; T n calculated in the Vasicek (1977) model (see Vasicek (1977, p. 185) ). In this model, the stochastic risk-free spot rates are linear functions of the single risk factor X r , which drives the evolution of the whole term structure of risk-free interest rates. It is well-known that the Vasicek model can produce negative interest rates. However, for 4 For example, in the macroeconomic version of McKinsey's credit portfolio model CreditPortfolioView (see Wilson (1997a,b) ), macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment rates or GDP growth, are used as explanatory variables for default probabilities. 5 However, the CreditMetrics model also exhibits a number of serious weaknesses. For example, it does not allow for lifecycle or underwriting effects, which are functions of the age of an account and the date of origination, respectively. Those two factors have been shown to be important in the collapse of the US mortgage market.
empirically estimated parameters, the probability of negative interest rates is usually small. Furthermore, it is not possible to adapt the model perfectly to a given term structure of interest rates. However, the CreditMetrics model could also be combined with any other term structure model for risk-free interest rates.
The stochastic average credit spread of rating grade Á n H 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g for the time interval OEH; T n is S Á n H .H; T n /.
6 The rating-specific credit spreads are assumed to be multivariate normally distributed random variables. This is what Kiesel et al (2003) found for the joint distribution of credit-spread changes, at least for longer time horizons, such as one year. Furthermore, it is assumed that the interest rate factor X r and the systematic credit risk factor Z are both correlated with the credit spreads. For the sake of simplicity, these correlation parameters are set equal to constants X r ;S and Z;S , respectively, regardless of the rating grade or the time to maturity.
7 By the correlation parameter Z;S , the bank's risk management can model their opinion of how rating-specific credit spreads tend to change as a consequence of changing economic conditions. The price Q p.X r ; H; T n / of a default risk-free zero-coupon bond is computed by discounting the standardized face value of one only with the stochastic risk-free spot rate R.X r ; H; T n /. If the issuer n of a zero-coupon bond has already defaulted at the risk horizon H (ie, Á n H D K), the value of the bond is set equal to the minimum of a beta-distributed fraction ı n of the value Q p.X r ; H; T n / of a risk-free, but otherwise identical, zero-coupon bond and the value of the bond without any rating transition of the obligor:
This is a modified version of the so-called "recovery-of-treasury" assumption, which is frequently used in credit risk pricing models (see, for example, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) ). The modification ensures that the recovery payment is never larger than the value of the defaultable bond without a default. The recovery rate is assumed to be independent across issuers and independent from all other stochastic variables of the model. For pricing the liabilities l.X r ; S Á bank 0 ; H; T m / of the bank, the simplifying assumption is used that the bank cannot default, but remains in its initial rating grade 6 Gaps between the firm-specific credit spreads and the average credit spread of obligors with the same rating grade are not modeled, but all issuers are treated as if the credit spread appropriate for them equals the average credit spread of the respective rating grade. This assumption implies that the idiosyncratic credit risk factors " n , n 2 f1; : : : ; N g, are independent of the rating-specific credit spreads S k .H; T n /, k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g. The realization of the random variable " n (together with those of the random variables Z and X r ) only determines the rating grade of obligor n at the risk horizon H and, hence, which marginal credit-spread distribution is applicable. 7 As R.X r ; H; T / is a linear function of X r , X r ;S is also the correlation parameter between R.X r ; H; T / and S k .H; T /. D Aa. Thus, only the probability distributions of the risk-free interest rates and the Aa credit spreads are relevant for the pricing of the bank's liabilities. However, it would not pose any methodological problems to introduce into the bottom-up model a varying rating of the bank that depends on the realized return on the bank's assets.
The approach described above is applied to a stylized bank portfolio. It is assumed that the bank's assets and liabilities are exclusively structured as zero-coupon bonds. The bank pursues a strategy of positive maturity transformation, which means that, on average, the maturity of the liabilities is shorter than the maturity of the ssets (see Figure 3 ). This is a typical strategy for banks in times of a normal (ie, increasing) term structure of risk-free interest rates. It is assumed that, in t D 0 as well as in t D H , the term structure of the bank's assets and liabilities is as indicated in Figure 3 . Thus, value variations caused by a decreasing time to maturity are not considered. All credits n 2 f1; : : : ; N g on the asset side are issued by different corporates, are defaultable and have a face value of one and a maturity date T n . The credit portfolio is assumed to be homogeneous with respect to the credit quality of the obligors. 8 The initial rating grades that we consider are Á 0 2 fAa; Baag. As mentioned above, the liabilities m 2 f1; : : : ; M g of the bank with maturity dates T m are assumed to be nondefaultable. Grundke (2010) for the reasoning for this choice).
Finally, the market value V e .H / of the bank's equity at the risk horizon H , comprising the effects of market and credit risks as measured within the bottom-up approach described above, is:
The chosen parameters of the bottom-up approach can be found in Table 1 .
REVERSE-STRESS-TEST PROCEDURE
The bottom-up approach described in Section 2 exhibits K C1 systematic risk factors: the systematic credit risk factor Z, the interest rate factor X r and the K 1 ratingspecific credit spreads. As we only consider the rating grades Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and Caa-C at the risk horizon, we have KC1 D 9. To reduce the computational burden of solving the inversion problem, only three-dimensional scenarios are considered for the reverse stress test. These consist of Z, X r and the credit spread S Á 0 of the initial rating grade Á 0 of the obligors. 9 These are the main risk drivers for the bank considered.
Depending on the initial rating grades of the obligors, the market value of the bank's equity at t D 0 is 69.12 for Aa (the equity-to-assets ratio based on market values is 11.98%) and 49.63 for Baa (the equity-to-assets ratio based on market values is 8.90%). These values correspond to the existing capital buffer B in the optimization problems ( 1.1)-(1.3) .
For the reverse stress test, we look for those combinations of Z, X r and S Á 0 that cause the sum of the decrease in the expected value of the bank's equity and conditional economic capital requirement to equal the existing capital buffer B. For finding these scenarios, a simple grid search is used: that part of the support of the normally distributed random variables Z, X r and S Á 0 that corresponds to the mean of these random variables plus/minus 2.5 times their standard deviation is split into twenty subintervals. For each of the 20 20 20 D 8000 possible combinations of realizations of Z, X r and S Á 0 , the conditional distribution of the bank's equity value at the risk horizon H is computed by Monte Carlo simulation with the bottom-up approach described in the previous section. Having fixed the systematic risk factors Z, X r and S Á 0 , only the idiosyncratic credit risk factors " n , n 2 f1; : : : ; N g, the beta-distributed recovery rates and the remaining rating-specific credit spreads S 1 ; : : : ; S Á 0 1 ; S Á 0 C1 ; : : : ; S K 1 have to be considered as random variables. For simulating the remaining credit spreads, their conditional (on the realizations of Z, X r and S Á 0 ) multivariate normal distribution is needed. If Y is an m-dimensional normally distributed random vector with the following partitioning:
with˙1 1 2 Rand˙2 2 2 R .m q/ .m q/ , respectively, symmetric positive semidefinite matrices, det.˙2 2 / ¤ 0 and˙1 2 D˙t 21 2 R q .m q/ , then the conditional distribution of Y 1 given Y 2 D y 2 is a multivariate normal distribution with mean:
and covariance matrix:˙j
In our application, we have Y 2 D .Z; X r ; S Á 0 / t . To compute the conditional distributions of the bank's equity value at the risk horizon H , the number of simulations D is set equal to 1000. This number seems to be rather low for Monte Carlo simulations, but as conditional (on the given realizations of Z; X r and the credit spread S Á 0 of the initial rating grade) distributions are computed, much of the uncertainty is already eliminated. Thus, despite this small number of simulation runs, the 95% confidence intervals for the risk measures are rather small. As risk measures, the VaR and the ES corresponding to a confidence level of˛D 99% are computed. 95% confidence intervals for these risk measures are calculated based on Glasserman (2004, p. 491) and Manistre and Hancock (2005) . A scenario .Z; X r ; S Á 0 / D .z; x; s/ is qualified to be a reverse-stress-test scenario when the corresponding sum of the decrease in the expected value of the bank's equity and the (conditional) economic capital requirement (defined as conditional expectation of the market value of the bank's equity minus the (1 ˛)-percentile (the (1 ˛)-expected shortfall)) lies within the interval defined by the existing capital buffer B plus/minus the bounds given by the 95% confidence intervals for the risk measures.
10
Of course, a finer grid and a larger number D of simulation runs for determining the conditional distribution of the bank's equity value at the risk horizon would be preferable. The choice of D determines the width of the confidence interval of the risk measures and it determines the potential confidence levels of the risk measures. Obviously, confidence levels larger than 99% are not possible with our choice D D 1000. However, with decreasing width of the intervals in the grid for the systematic risk factors Z; X r and S Á 0 and an increasing number of simulation runs D, the computational burden of the reverse stress test increases enormously (for each grid point, a separate Monte Carlo simulation has to be carried out!). Thus, we have the classical trade-off between accuracy and practicability. Possible improvements of the procedure described here might be to increase the number of simulation runs, but to use a more sophisticated search method for solving the inversion problem so that fewer Monte Carlo simulations have to be done. Alternatively, first, a gross grid search could be combined with a low number of simulation runs to identify the regions of interest for the systematic risk factors and, afterward, for these regions, more precise computations could be carried out with a larger number of simulations runs and a finer grid.
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RESULTS
For the initial rating grade Baa, Table 2 on the facing page and Table 3 on page 86 show those realizations of the systematic risk factors Z and X r and the credit spread S Baa of the obligors' initial rating grade that cause the sum of the decrease in the expected value of the bank's equity (EL) and the conditional 99% VaR (ES) to be approximately equal to the existing capital buffer B D 49:63. For the initial rating grade Aa, no combination of realizations of Z; X r and S Aa (within the given intervals of the grid) could be found that consumes the whole capital buffer B D 69:12. As can be seen in Table 2 on the facing page and Table 3 on page 86, for the initial rating grade Baa, reverse-stress-test scenarios consist of low values for the systematic credit risk factor Z and high values for the systematic interest rate factor X r and the credit spread S Baa , respectively. In tendency, higher Z values can be substituted by higher X r values. However, there is a maximum value for Z: when Z is larger than 0:75, no combination of X r and S Baa can be found that produces a reverse-stress-test scenario.
What cannot be seen from the tables is that the decrease in the expected value of the bank's equity consumes most of the existing capital buffer. The conditional 99% VaR (ES) only amounts to around 10-15% of the capital buffer.
In Table 2 on the facing page and Table 3 on page 86, the probabilities that the random variables Z; X r and S Baa will be in the respective combination of intervals employed for the grid search are also shown. The most probable scenario is shown in bold. The probabilities are computed based on the multivariate normal distribution of the three random variables Z; X r and S Baa . As can be seen, the most probable reverse-stress-test scenarios are identical for both risk measures. Of course, as Z; X r and S Baa are continuous random variables, the computed probabilities depend on the step size of the grid search. Thus, the probabilities can only give an ordinal ranking of the likelihood of the different reverse-stress-test scenarios.
In the bottom-up approach employed for this reverse stress test, the random variable Z has no specific economic meaning, but can be understood as a latent factor that drives the obligors'credit quality and that might represent an equity or macroeconomic index. This is a drawback when risk managers or senior bank managers try to check the plausibility of the reverse-stress-test scenarios. However, based on (2.1)-(2.3), the influence of the reverse-stress-test scenarios for Z and X r on the conditional transition and default probabilities can be analyzed and the plausibility of these conditional probabilities can be checked. Table 4 on page 87 shows the unconditional transition This table shows those realizations of the systematic risk factors Z and X r and the credit spread S Á 0 of the obligors' initial rating grade that cause the sum of the decrease in the expected value of the bank's equity (EL) and the conditional 99% VaR being approximately equal to the capital buffer B. The initial rating grade of all obligors is Baa. For the grid search, that part of the support of the normally distributed random variables Z, X r and S Á 0 that corresponds to the mean of these random variables plus/minus 2.5 times their standard deviation is split into twenty subintervals. The probabilities that the random variables Z, X r and S Á 0 will be in the respective combination of intervals are also exhibited. The most probable scenario is shown in bold. The credit-spread step is the number of the grid interval for the credit spread S Á 0 in the respective reverse-stress-test scenario. The exhibited realizations of Z, X r and S Á 0 correspond to the respective left bounds of the grid intervals. This table shows those realizations of the systematic risk factors Z and X r and the credit spread S Á 0 of the obligors' initial rating grade that cause the sum of the decrease in the expected value of the bank's equity (EL) and the conditional 99% ES being approximately equal to the capital buffer B.The initial rating grade of all obligors is Baa. For the grid search, that part of the support of the normally distributed random variables Z, X r and S Á 0 that corresponds to the mean of these random variables plus/minus 2.5 times their standard deviation is split into twenty subintervals. The probabilities that the random variables Z, X r and S Á 0 will be in the respective combination of intervals are also exhibited. The most probable scenario is shown in bold. The credit-spread step is the number of the grid interval for the credit spread S Á 0 in the respective reverse-stress-test scenario. The exhibited realizations of Z, X r and S Á 0 correspond to the respective left bounds of the grid intervals.
matrix employed for the simulations as well as the conditional transition matrix for the most probable reverse-stress-test scenario Z D 2:25 and X r D 1:75. As can be seen, the multiplier between the unconditional and conditional default probabilities is between 2.5 and 15.3. The multiplier is larger the better the rating grade is. Finally, Figure 4 on page 88 shows how the term structure of risk-free interest rates changes in the most probable reverse-stress-test scenario (ie, X r D 1:75). As can be seen, for the Vasicek model, this scenario corresponds to an upward shift in the risk-free spot rate by 1.45 percentage points at the short end of the term structure and by 0.36 percentage points for a maturity of twelve years, which is the longest maturity of the bank's assets and liabilities. Furthermore, this scenario causes a change from a normal to an inverse term structure of risk-free interest rates.
CONCLUSIONS
Bottom-up approaches model interactions between different risk types on the level of the individual financial instruments and risk factors. This makes these specific integrated risk management techniques ideal candidates for carrying out quantitative reverse stress tests because they allow users to solve the inversion problem and, in particular, to compute the probabilities of reverse-stress-test scenarios while taking existing risk dependencies into account. This has been demonstrated with an extended CreditMetrics model that exhibits correlated interest rate and rating-specific creditspread risk. Obviously, the analysis presented here could be extended in various directions. First, the latent systematic credit risk factor Z could be substituted by one or several macroeconomic variables that drive the obligors' credit quality. This would ease the interpretability of this risk factor and, hence, the plausibility check for specific scenarios. Second, several other modifications of the employed bottom-up approach are also imaginable. For example, the risk factor sensitivities could be modeled as functions of the systematic credit risk factors (see, for example, Andersen and Sidenius (2004) ). By doing this, increasing asset-return correlations in economic downturns could be integrated into the model. Furthermore, conditional (real and risk-neutralized) transition probabilities, recovery rates and stochastic credit spreads could be modeled in a more consistent framework (see, for example, Lando (1998)) or systematic recovery rate risk could be introduced (see, for example, Pykhtin (2003) ). Third, the analysis could be extended to more complex bank portfolios that also contain, for example, floating rate notes or interest rate derivatives such as swaps or options. To find out the relevant risk factors from a multitude of factors that influence the value of the bank's equity, the dimension reduction technique of Skoglund and Chen (2009) could be employed. However, it has to be admitted that bottom-up approaches as specific integrated risk management techniques are only in the very early stages of development. Thus, quantitative reverse stress tests based on bottom-up approaches are also in their infancy. For example, no bottom-up approach exists in which operational risks are integrated. Furthermore, empirical validations of the chosen model assumptions with respect to the distributions of the risk factors in bottom-up approaches and their stochastic dependencies hardly exist. However, these assumptions are important for the computation of probabilities for reverse-stress-test scenarios. Finally, back-testing analyses of bottom-up approaches do not exist at all.
Up to the time of writing, no standards for reverse stress tests (or for regular stress tests) had emerged, but banks will have to convince the supervisory authorities that the chosen bank-specific approach is plausible and sufficiently conservative.
